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The  accumulation  of  human  capital  is  important  for  an  individual’s  future  life 
chances, both in terms of continuing in education and with regard to labour market 
outcomes. The qualifications achieved at the end of compulsory schooling provide an 
accurate marker for both. The differential attainment across ethnic groups through 
formal  schooling  is  a  cause  for  concern,  given  that  there  appear  to  be  persistent 
differences across the different groups. In the US, for example, the long term focus 
has been on the underachievement of Black students relative to their White peers; 
more recently the Hispanic-White test score gap has also gained attention (see Neal 
(2005) for a recent review). In England the picture is more mixed: on average, White 
students outperform students from some minority ethnic groups (Black Caribbean, 
Pakistani,  Bangladeshi,  for  example),  but  are  outperformed  by  others,  including 
Indian  and  Chinese  (Wilson  et  al  2005;  see  also  Modood  2005).  There  are  many 
potential  explanations  for  these  observed  differential  education  outcomes,  not 
mutually exclusive. These include non-school factors such as poverty, social class and 
family background
1, school factors such as differential school quality
2 , the quality of 
teachers and other educational inputs
3 and teacher and/or system biases
4.  
 
In this paper we focus on the impact of the ethnic composition of the student’s school 
and neighbourhood on test score outcomes. US evidence, discussed below, suggests 
strongly that segregation worsens the test score gap. But the context in England is 
different, in terms of the nature of the school system, the relative performance of 
minority ethnic students and the levels of segregation. Our results add to the wider 
debate  about  the  ‘effects  of  segregation’  from  this  different  perspective.  We  ask 
whether ethnic segregation in schools and in neighbourhoods has a causal effect on 
differential  school  attainment.  Determining  whether  there  is  a  causal  effect  is  not 
straightforward since it is likely that the characteristics of students that are associated 
with attainment will be correlated with school composition: for example, more able 
minority ethnic pupils may attend schools with higher minority composition. We ask 
two  related  but  different  questions,  which  entail  different  assumptions  for 
identification. First, we look at the score gap between White pupils and a minority 
group (separately for three different minorities). This is the question typically posed 
in the US and uses an identification strategy based on data aggregated to city level, 
and  compared  across  cities.  Secondly,  we  consider  the  absolute  performance  of 
minority students across cities with varying levels of segregation. This analysis relies 
on a matching approach to match minority pupils across cities and a regression on the 
matched pairs to control for a host of city characteristics.  
 
Evidence for the US from a similar dataset to ours comes from Card and Rothstein 
(2007). They find that higher segregation increases the Black-White score gap, with a 
shift from a highly segregated city to a nearly integrated city removing about a quarter 
of the raw gap. They use student level data as we do, and deal with the endogeneity 
problem in the same way, by averaging up to city level, thereby side-stepping within-
                                                 
1 See Phillips et al (1998); Modood (2003); Bradley and Taylor (2004) and Friesen and Krauth (2007). 
2 See Fryer and Levitt (2004, 2005); Hanushek and Rivkin (2006). 
3 See Clotfelter et al (2004), Hanushek et al (2005), and also Card and Rothstein (2007) and Reber 
(2007a, 2007b). 
4  See Jencks (1998), Ferguson (2003) and Tikly (2005)   3 
city non-random sorting. Other recent evidence comes from Ananat (2007), who uses 
19
th  Century  railway  configurations  to  instrument  for  the  extent  to  which  cities 
became segregated during African-American immigration in the 19
th Century. She 
finds  that  blacks  are  worse  off  across  a  range  of  education  and  income-related 
outcomes in areas that are more segregated compared to those that are less segregated. 
Echenique  et  al  (2006)  also  find  that  segregation  has  a  significant,  negative 
relationship with test scores for Black, Asian and Hispanic students relative to Whites 
for a sample of around 90,000 7
th -12
th graders in the US in the mid 1990s. The 
authors stress, however, that their results may not be causal.  
 
In what ways might school and neighbourhood ethnic composition affect schooling 
outcomes? It could be that the ethnicity of a student’s peers is simply a proxy for their 
academic  ability  and/or  their  socioeconomic  status,  which  in  turn  suggests  a  peer 
effects mechanism (Vigdor and Ludwig 2007; Cooley 2006). A more insidious peer 
effects mechanism is that of ‘acting White’, whereby Black peers and communities 
impose costs on their members who try to ‘act White’, thus creating a disincentive to 
engage in certain behaviours such as studying hard (Austen Smith and Fryer 2005 and 
references  therein).  Cook  and  Ludwig  (1998)  discuss  how  this  can  lead  to 
academically successful Black students being disparaged and/or reducing their effort 
in order to avoid taunts. Thus the composition of the school influences individual 
effort.  Modood  (2003)  notes  that  this  is  one  common  explanation  for  the  under-
achievement of Black Caribbean male students in the UK. 
 
There  is  a  large  literature  on  the  importance  of  aspiration  and  expectation  in 
explaining  ethnic  differences  in  educational  attainment  (Kao  and  Tienda  1998; 
Khattab 2003). While parents are an important source of educational and occupational 
aspiration (Schneider and Stevenson 1999), school composition – or levels of school 
segregation – may additionally impact on these aspirations in two opposing directions. 
The  first  stokes  up  aspirations  as  minority  students  face  lesser  competition  from 
majority students and thus judge their performance relative to other minority students 
in their school (Shavit and Williams 1985). The second may restrict aspirations; areas 
with high concentrations of minorities are less likely to attract families from high 
socio-economic groups and high levels of resources/investment. Students in schools 
in such areas may be less focussed on academic activities and less likely to have high 
academic aspirations with a potential effect on performance. They may also be less 
exposed to aspirational role models within their locale
5. 
 
In strong contrast to the US findings, we show that the test score gap between White 
and minority students is largely unaffected by segregation for the three groups we 
study  (Black  Caribbean,  Indian,  and  Pakistani  pupils).  Furthermore,  when  we 
compare the performance of minority students across cities, we find no evidence of a 
negative impact of ethnic segregation on test score outcomes. There is considerable 
variation in school segregation across England for these ethnic groups, but it appears 
to have no detrimental impact on school attainment.  
 
The  rest  of  the  paper  is  structured  as  follows.  In  the  next  section  we  outline  our 
empirical model and derive the equations we estimate for the two different sets of 
results. Section 3 provides details of the data we use. In section 4 we present our 
                                                 
5  See Wilson (1987), Zhou (2005) and Cutler, Glaeser and Vigdor (2005).   4 
results; first looking at the test score gap, then focusing on how segregation impacts 
on the absolute attainment of each minority group. Section 5 concludes and discusses 
the potential policy implications of our results. 
 
 
2. Empirical Model 
 
a)  Basic Model 
 
We start with a simple model to make the issues clear and then generalise to the 
model we actually implement; this largely follows the approach of Card and Rothstein 
(2007). We assume that a student’s score depends on personal characteristics of the 
student, and characteristics of her school, local neighbourhood and city
6. The key 
feature is that we also allow the composition of the school to affect students’ test 















isc S Z X g e m g b a + + + + =           (1) 
 
where  superscript  G  refers  to  ethnic  group,  X  is  a  set  of  observable  personal 
characteristics, Z a set of observable school characteristics, and S is the proportion of 
the school’s students from the ethnic minority. Unobservable school influences are 
G
sc m , the common error component for students of group G in school s in city c, and an 
individual error eisc , with zero mean within each school, city and ethnic group. City 
effects are implicit and absorbed by the school effects, observed and unobserved, as in 
Card and Rothstein (2007). For brevity in this section, we will refer to just two ethnic 
groups: a minority and White, so G = M, W.  
 
There are obvious problems with estimating (1) straightforwardly on individual or 
school-level data since students are not randomly assigned to schools. It seems very 
likely that characteristics of students that are associated with educational performance 
will be correlated with school composition through the decisions of schools and/or 
families on which children go to which schools. This correlation could produce a bias 
of either sign for g, depending on whether more able (or more supported) minority 
ethnic  pupils  go  to  schools  with  higher  minority  composition  or  not.  The  key 
statistical problem is the non-random sorting of families of different ethnicities across 
schools and neighbourhoods in an area.  
 
Another  potential  problem  with  school-level  estimation  is  reverse  causality.  For 
example,  it  may  be  that  schools  that  do  well  for  Indian  pupils  attract  a 
disproportionate number of such pupils. We set out the approaches to deal with these 





                                                 
6 We refer to the aggregate geographical unit as a city for convenience. In the empirical work, we use 
two different definitions for this.    5 
b)  Modelling the test score gap 
 
Continuing with the simple model in (1), we can eliminate the selection problems of 











c S Z X g m g b a + + + =             (2) 
 
The average test score of an ethnic group in a city depends on their characteristics, the 
average ethnic composition of schools in the city and the quality of the schools they 
go to. To make the point simply, assume for now that all the coefficients are the same 
for both groups: a
M = a
W = α. Taking the difference between ethnic groups at city 




c g g g D º - : 
 
c c c c c S Z X g m g b a D + D + D + D = D            (3) 
 
Observed and unobserved city-wide influences disappear.  c Z D measures differences 
in the characteristics of schools disproportionately attended by minority and White 
pupils, such as the gap in average school quality.  
 
The term  c S D is a measure of segregation. Fully segregated schools imply  1 = D c S  
and fully integrated schools imply  0 = D c S . There is a vast literature on measuring 
segregation.  Two  key  references  are  Duncan  and  Duncan  (1955)  who  set  out  the 
formal foundations for measuring segregation, and Massey and Denton (1988) who 
delineate different dimensions of segregation, examine the links between them, and 
assess their empirical performance. The approach we use derives from the economic 
model  set  out  above.  Subtracting  the  city  average  school  ethnic  composition, 
weighted by minority pupils, from the same, weighted by White pupils ( c S D ), yields 
a measure that is closely related to the standard isolation index
7. For example, this is 
the  difference  in  the  average  school  percentage  of  Black  Caribbean  students 




Note that, given the model and definitions we adopt, the impact of school segregation 
on the distribution of test scores and the impact of school composition on individual 
scores is the same. While in this formulation these all come from the same model and 
represent different version of the same question, statistical issues mean that the more 
aggregated approach is more likely to provide robust estimates. 
 
By estimating at city-level, we are by-passing the endogenous within-city sorting that 
would  make  school  or  individual  level  analysis  problematic.  By  using  differences 
                                                 
7 It is in fact the eta-squared index. 
8 Note that for both school and neighbourhood segregation we combine three cohorts to increase 
precision. We use segregation in the final year of schooling. An alternative would have been to produce 
school-year-specific measures for each ‘city’ and then average. But this was computationally 
cumbersome, and in other research we have shown that school segregation in much of England has 
been changing only very slowly, if at all (Johnston, Burgess, Harris and Wilson, 2008). This implies 
that the current level of segregation is a good proxy for the level that the students would have 
experienced throughout their time in school.   6 
across ethnic groups within a city, we remove all within-city factors that affect the 
minority and White groups equally. However, there may be city-level factors that 
influence the two groups differently, so these will not net out. We need therefore to 
include  city  level  variables  to  capture  as  much  of  this  heterogeneity  as  we  can. 
Similarly, there may be differences in the differences of averaged school errors over 
the different groups of pupils across cities,  c m D , and any uncontrolled correlation of 
this with segregation will bias the results. Again, including city-level variables will 
deal  with  some  of  this  heterogeneity.  The  key  identification  assumption  is  that 
families do not locate in cities for education reasons. Choosing neighbourhoods and 
schools within a city for education reasons is not a problem as that is averaged out. 
The difficulty we face in this paper is that there are relatively few areas (‘cities’) in 
England with sufficient numbers of minority ethnic pupils, thus limiting degrees of 
freedom quite severely. We can only include a much smaller number of city-level 
variables than Card and Rothstein (2007).  
 
We extend this basic model in two ways for estimation. First, we allow the effect of 
school quality and all individual characteristics to differ by ethnic group, so allowing 
a
M and a
W etc to differ. That is, we regress gisc on all available pupil characteristics 
and school fixed effects, all interacted with ethnicity and take the residuals, risc, as the 
dependent variable. This method allows the most flexibility in allowing potentially 
different  effects  for  different  ethnic  groups  of  gender,  poverty  and  school  fixed 
effects. 
 
Second, we also include neighbourhood segregation as a potential explanatory of test 
score gaps. Neighbourhood ethnic composition, Wc.p
G, is added to (1), and treated 
symmetrically  to  S  in  reaching  (3),  so  that  the  final  regression  includes  c W D ,  a 
measure of neighbourhood segregation. We also analyse a model with neighbourhood 
segregation and orthogonalised school segregation, the latter being the residual from a 
regression  of  school  segregation  on  neighbourhood  segregation.  This  allows  us  to 
separately address school and neighbourhood segregation
9.  
 
The final term to deal with in (3) is  c Z D . This represents the difference in mean 
school factors as experienced by minority pupils relative to White pupils in each city. 
Arguably  this  is  part  of  the  effect  of  segregation:  some  groups  disproportionately 
attending  better  schools.  In  any  case,  practically  it  is  impossible  to  measure  all 
relevant  aspects  of  schools  so  this  term  becomes  part  of  the  error  term  and  the 
estimated  coefficient  gives  the  direct  effect  of  segregation  per  se  –  school  ethnic 
composition on outcomes – plus the indirect effect of differential school quality. The 
model we finally estimate is therefore a reduced form: 
 
c c c c c e W S r + S + D ¢ + D ¢ = D . . . d p g             (4) 
 




                                                 
9 There are then further interesting questions on the way school sorting is generated from 
neighbourhood sorting, but that is a topic for another paper.   7 
c)  Modelling ethnic minority test scores 
 
Essentially we want to compare the distribution of educational outcomes across two 
cities  where  the  school-age  minority  population  is  the  same  in  terms  of  its  basic 
individual characteristics, but is different in the degree of segregation experienced in 
schools.  
 
We  start  from  (1)  with  two  minor  differences:  since  we  are  now  examining 
differences across cities within a minority group we leave the G superscript implicit 
as we estimate separately by group, so all the coefficients are implicitly different by 
group. We also use a dichotomous split between high segregation cities (treated; T) 
and low segregation cities (untreated; U). So the modified basic equation is: 
 
[ ] isc sc sc isc isc T Z X g e m g b a + + + + =        (5) 
 
We match pupils on the basis of personal characteristics, and analyse the score gap 
between  each  minority  pupil  in  a  high  segregation  city  and  their  match  in  a  low 
segregation city
10. Using the notation,  U c s j T isc isc g g g = ¢ = - º Ñ where j is i’s match (and 
attends school s¢), and Xisc = Xjs’c, the model implies:  
 
[ ] is s s C is Z g e m g b Ñ + Ñ + + Ñ = Ñ           (6) 
 
We include city-level variables to pick up the heterogeneity between the high- and 
low-segregation  cities.  We  make  the  standard  assumption  of  conditional  mean 
independence and, under that assumption, estimating (6) group by group gives an 
unbiased  estimate  of  g  for  each  group.  An  important  question,  which  we  discuss 
below, is how to interpret the different results controlling for, and not controlling for, 
neighbourhood and school quality measures. 
 
The  analysis  we  implement  is  to  match  on  pupil  characteristics  and  to  run  the 
following regression on the difference between each pupil’s score and that of her 
match: 
 
{ } u Q N g s i c is + Ñ + Ñ + S Ñ + = Ñ . . . j d p g           (7) 
 
where N are neighbourhood variables and Q a  school quality measure. As above, 
since we do not capture all the dimensions of school quality, the interpretation of the 






                                                 
10 A city is assumed to be treated if its school segregation measure is equal to or larger than the 90
th 
percentile of the city school segregation measure. For Black Caribbean, Indian and Pakistani pupils 
mean city school segregation measure for treated cities is 0.10, 0.26 and 0.42 respectively while for 
untreated cities it is 0.03, 0.06 and 0.11 respectively.    8 
3. Data 
 
a)  Datasets and Variables 
 
Our  key  dataset  is  the  Pupil  Level  Annual  School  Census  (PLASC),  part  of  the 
National  Pupil  Database  (NPD)  released  to  us  by  the  Department  for  Children, 
Schools  and  Families  (DCSF,  formally  the  Department  for  Education  and  Skills 
(DfES)). PLASC is a census of all children in state schools in England, taken each 
year in January for the cohorts we use. Each cohort has approximately 0.5 million 
pupils. We use the first three PLASCs, taken in 2002, 2003, and 2004. We pool three 
cohorts  of  pupils,  in  their  final  year  of  compulsory  schooling  (age  16,  year  11) 
respectively in 2002, 2003 and 2004. Given the low numbers in some minority ethnic 
groups this gives us more data. This yields a pupil-level dataset of approximately 1.6 
million  observations  (see  Table  1).  Whilst  at  first  glance  this  seems  far  more 
observations than are needed for the task, schools in England remain largely White – 
88% of pupils are White. So even this very large dataset only yields a barely adequate 
number of minority ethnic pupils for the purposes of our analysis.  
 
PLASC provides a number of personal characteristics, including gender, within-year 
age, free school meal eligibility (FSM, an indicator of poverty), whether English is a 
pupil’s  mother  tongue,  whether  the  pupil  has  special  educational  needs,  and  the 
pupil’s ethnicity
11.  The ethnic groups we use are shown in Table 1. As can be seen, 
the sample is mostly White, with only the following ethnic groups having more than 
1%  of  pupils:  Black  Caribbean  (1.4%),  Black  African  (1.3%),  Indian  (2.6%)  and 
Pakistani (2.5%). We have been given access to the full postcode (zipcode) of each 
pupil’s home address
12. In the UK as a whole there are around 1.78m unit postcodes 
covering 27.5m addresses
13. On average, there are 15 addresses in a unit postcode. 
We  use  this  very  precise  information  on  a  pupil’s  location  when  defining  their 
neighbourhood.  For  example,  we  can  match  pupils’  postcodes  to  the  Mosaic 
classification of that address
14.  
 
PLASC can be linked to other datasets from the NPD, including a pupil’s test score 
history  and  the  characteristics  of  the  school  they  attend.  We  use  the  pupil’s  total 
GSCE point score as our key outcome variable. The GSCE exams are nationally set 
and marked exams taken at the end of compulsory schooling, and are important for 
the pupil’s future progress in education or the labour market. We proxy prior ability 
with scores from another set of nationally set and marked tests taken at age 11, just 
prior to entering secondary school; these are Key Stage 2 (KS2) tests. 
 
                                                 
11 We use ethnicity reported in 2002 for all three cohorts. This is because most schools used broad 
ethnicity codes in PLASC 2002. However, from PLASC 2003 it was mandatory to use the more 
disaggregated ethnicity codes used in the 2001 population census. As each cohort is at the end of 
compulsory schooling we do not have the more recent ethnicity codes for the 2002 cohort. We do have 
the older ethnicity codes for the 2003 and 2004 cohorts. 
12 For further details see http://www.statistics.gov.uk/geography/postal_geog.asp  
13 As of May 2005. 
14 Mosaic classification is a postcode level dataset which therefore describes the area around 12 
dwellings on average. The data categorises each postcode into one of 61 types on the basis of 
demographics, socio-economics and consumption, financial measures, and property characteristics and 
value. For more information see http://www.experian.co.uk/business/products/data/113/html.    9 
b)  Defining the geographical units 
 
We locate each pupil in a neighbourhood using their postcode, and use two levels of 
definition  for  ‘neighbourhood’.  To  compute  neighbourhood  segregation,  we  use 
Middle-Layer Super Output Areas (MSOA) as our definition of neighbourhood. There 
are just under 7,000 MSOAs in England, with a mean population of 7,200 and a 
minimum of 5,000; they are designed to be of roughly the same size. These are the 
rough equivalent of an electoral ward but are more homogeneous in size.  
 
To  characterise  where  people  live,  the  data  we  use  permits  a  smaller,  more 
disaggregate definition. We use the Indices of Deprivation 2004 (ID 2004) produced 
by the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM). The ID 2004 include several 
indices  of  deprivation  along  domains  such  as  income,  employment,  health  and 
disability, education and crime. In our analysis we exploit two of these indices, the 
index of income deprivation and the index of employment deprivation, both measured 
on a scale of 1 to 100 (with 100 indicating high deprivation)
15. These indices are 
available at Lower-layer Super Output Area (LSOA) level. There are 32,482 lower 
SOAs in England with a mean population of 1,500 and a minimum of 1,000. 
 
There are two main choices for defining the aggregate spatial units for the analysis, 
the ‘cities’ in the terminology of the model. One is the Local Authority (LA), which 
largely defines an education ‘market’ (over 90% of pupils attend a school in the LA in 
which they reside, less so in London). The LA is also to some degree a policy-making 
unit. There is a particular problem with London, however, if we adopt LAs as the 
aggregate unit. London is divided into 33 fairly small LAs. As we have seen above, 
the key assumption for our identification strategy is that families do not locate in a 
particular aggregate unit for education-related reasons. Any such differential sorting 
across LAs would jeopardise the interpretation of our estimates. This seems unlikely 
to hold for London: in fact 20% of pupils cross an LA border within London. So, after 
a degree of experimentation, we merged all the London LAs into one large unit. The 
disadvantage is that by doing this we lose a lot of aggregate units to compare across; 
however, the point is that some of these comparisons would have been confounded by 
selection. We tried other permutations such as splitting London into quadrants, or 
quadrants  plus  a  centre.  These  did  not  dramatically  affect  the  results  but  are  less 
plausible in terms of identification. The fact that London is empirically defined as a 
single local labour market (see next paragraph) suggests that treating as a sngle entity 
is the safest approach. 
 
The alternative is to define the aggregate units by where people live and work. This is 
in some ways closer to the spirit of the identification strategy and is also closer to the 
standard implementation of a cross-city research design. In particular, it is useful to 
have a definition that includes both city centre and some rural and suburban fringes in 
the same aggregate unit. This deals with the phenomenon of ‘White flight’ as the 
families moving out of the city centre will be retained in the same spatial unit. We 
                                                 
15 The income deprivation index is based on the numbers of adults and children in households claiming 
income contingent benefits, such as Income Support, Income Based Jobseekers Allowance and the 
Working Families Tax Credit. The employment deprivation index is based on; the unemployment 
claimant count, Incapacity Benefit claimants, Severe Disability Allowance claimants and participation 
in the New Deal (for 18-24s, 25+ and lone parents). We also compute median household income from 
Experian Mosaic data.   10 
therefore also use Travel to Work Areas (TTWAs)
16 as the definition of the aggregate 
unit  in  the  cross-city  analysis.    TTWAs  are  labour  markets  and  seem  a  natural 
implementation of a unit where people choose to live and work. They are defined by 
an algorithm that aims to identify areas where 75% of the people who live there also 
work there, and where 75% of the people who work there also live there. In fact, LAs 
and TTWAs offer quite different geographies: dense urban areas tend to be split into 
different LAs but be single TTWAs, while rural areas tend to be big LAs but split into 
many TTWAs. The pattern is shown in Figure 1. The major urban conurbations are 
split into a number of different LAs but are typically defined as single TTWAs.  
 
We control for several LA level variables in the post-matching regression. These are 
the ethnic group proportion; average income deprivation (an average across LSOAs 
within the LA); proportion of lone parents; unemployment rate (gender and ethnicity 
specific); proportion of people with ‘lower level’ qualifications (ethnicity specific)
17; 
proportion  of  people  with  ‘higher  level’  qualifications  (ethnicity  specific)
18; 
proportion of people of managerial or professional occupations (ethnicity specific)
19; 
proportion of people born outside UK (ethnicity specific); and the score assigned to 
the LA by the Comprehensive Performance Assessments published by Ofsted. This 
provides a measure of the quality of education provision across the LA
20.  
 
c)  Defining the estimation sample 
 
Minority ethnic populations are clustered in a relatively small number of urban areas 
around England. Most LAs and TTWAs have negligible minority populations. The 
historical patterns of migrant settlement in the UK mean that ethnic minority groups 
are not spread evenly across the country
21. Black Caribbean communities are most 
prevalent in London and to a lesser degree in Birmingham and Manchester, but rarer 
elsewhere.  Families  of  Indian,  Pakistani  and  Bangladeshi  ethnicity  are  also  well 
represented  in  London,  but  are  also  found  in  significant  numbers  in  northern  and 
midlands cities such as Manchester, Leicester, Oldham, Bradford and Blackburn. We 
therefore  have  a  trade-off  in  defining  the  areas  to  include  in  the  sample.  Only 
choosing areas with relatively large numbers of minority pupils will mean few areas 
in the estimation; having more areas means including some with few minority pupils 
to average over.  
 
Table 2 shows the number of LAs we have in our sample if we restrict our analysis to 
only  those  LAs  that  have  a  minority  population  that  is  at  least  2%  of  the  total 
population in that LA; we also show the situation with a cut-off of 1%. Note that there 
                                                 
16 See http://www.statistics.gov.uk/geography/ttwa.asp for more information. 
17 ‘Lower level’ qualifications describe qualifications equivalent to levels 1. to 3. of the National Key 
Learning targets (i.e. GCSE’s, ‘O’ levels, ‘A’ levels, NVQ levels 1. to 3.). 
18 ‘Higher level’ qualifications describe qualifications equivalent to level 4. and above of the National 
Key Learning targets (i.e. first degree, higher degrees, NVQ levels 4. and 5., HND, HNC and certain 
professional qualifications). 
19 Managers, Senior Officials, Professional Occupations, Associate Professional and Technical 
Occupations. 
20 Note that at first approximation, LA budgets are centrally determined using a capitation formula 
which is designed to account for differences in deprivation etc. We therefore focus here on city-wide 
differences in quality rather than resources. 
 
21 A history of immigration into the UK can be found in Winder (2004).   11 
are 150 LAs in England. The table also shows the minimum number of the minority 
group across those LAs. This shows that even using the less stringent 1% cut off, 
most LAs are dropped for every minority group. Only for Indian, Pakistani, Other and 
Black Caribbean pupils are there more than 20 LAs in the sample. For this reason, the 






a)  Summary statistics  
 
Table  1  provides  some  useful  summary  facts.  On  average,  White  pupils  score  41 
points at GCSE
22. This is higher than some groups: 33 for Black Caribbean, 38 for 
Black African and 38 for Pakistani pupils. But it is lower than or similar to others: 48 
for Indian pupils, 40 for Bangladeshi and 55 for Chinese pupils. This mixed pattern 
provides an interesting context for the analysis; of the two most numerous minority 
groups, one scores higher than Whites (Indian) and one less (Pakistani).  
 
The table also provides two contextual variables. Pupils of White, Indian and Chinese 
ethnicity are the least poor in terms of free school meal eligibility (12, 13 and 13% 
respectively).  The  poorest  groups  are  Bangladeshi,  Pakistani  and  Black  African. 
Unsurprisingly, this pattern is repeated in terms of neighbourhoods: Whites, Indian 
and Chinese pupils live on average in the least deprived neighbourhoods, Bangladeshi 
and Pakistani pupils the most deprived, and the Black communities intermediate.  
 
b)  Test-score Gaps  
 
We first address the minority – White test score gap
23. Throughout, we present the 
results separately for the three selected minority groups: Black Caribbean, Indian and 
Pakistani. The model is given by (4) repeated here:  
 
c c c c c e W S r + S + D ¢ + D ¢ = D . . . d p g   
 
Figure 2 plots the test-score gap,  c r D , against first school segregation,  c S D , and then 
neighbourhood segregation,  c W D . We control for the city level variables, Sc, in the 
regressions shortly, but the Figure shows the broad structure of the data. The unit in 
the figure is a ‘city’: these plots are based on LAs as the ‘city’, but we present the 
regressions for both these and TTWAs. The units are weighted by the number of the 
respective  minority  ethnic  pupils.  School  segregation  is  obviously  computed  over 
schools, and the neighbourhood segregation measure uses MSOAs as the definition of 
                                                 
22 Each GCSE examination is given a grade, from A*, through A, B, C, …G, and then U (unclassified). 
A*-G are passes and have the following point equivalents: A*=8, A = 7, …. G = 1. The average 
number of GCSEs taken by students in England is 8, so the maximum point score in that case is 64. A 
student needs a minimum of five passes at grade C or equivalent, i.e. 25 points, to progress to post-16 
education. 
23 Note that r is the residual test score gap after controlling for pupil characteristics and school fixed 
effects in a fully flexible way. The results of this regression are in Appendix Table 1.   12 
neighbourhood.  Note  that  there  is  an  implicit  assumption  of  a  linear  effect  of 
segregation here; the second approach uses a dichotomous high/low specification.  
 
Taking Black Caribbean pupils first, a number of points stand out. First, the points 
gap is always negative, ranging from less than 1 GCSE point in Nottingham to around 
12  points  in  Reading.  Second,  there  is  little  variation  in  segregation.  Segregation 
varies between 0 and 0.1, with only two LAs (London and Birmingham which are 
clearly outliers) having values above 0.06. Third, there does appear to be evidence of 
a  negative  relationship  between  the  Black  Caribbean-White  test  score  gap  and 
segregation. However, there is one area that dominates the rest in terms of size – this 
is  London,  combining  the  small  LAs  as  described  above.  Both  this  and  the  next 
largest,  Birmingham,  are  substantially  bigger  than  the  others,  and  this  causes 
problems throughout this analysis. In this case, the negative relationship in the Figure 
is dominated by the position of London. Looking at the neighbourhood segregation 
plot, again the slope is negative and largely driven by London.   
 
A  different  pattern  emerges  for  Indian  pupils.  There  is  much  more  variation  in 
segregation; ranging from zero to over 0.4, and with the exception of Trafford the 
Indian-White  test  score  gap  is  always  positive.  There  is  little  clear  evidence  of  a 
relationship between the test score gap and segregation, although if  anything it is 
positive. The pattern for residential segregation is the same.  
 
The Figures for Pakistani pupils show the most segregation out of these three groups 
(this echoes our earlier findings (Burgess and Wilson 2005)), ranging from zero to 
0.5. There are a number of LAs with positive and a number with negative test score 
gaps,  with  the  gap  ranging  from  around  +10  to  –13  GCSE  points.  There  is  little 
evidence of a relationship between the test score gap and segregation but the evidence 
there is suggests it would be negative. Again, the pattern is very much the same using 
residential segregation.  
 
However, as equation (4) makes clear, we need to control for other influences on test 
score gaps at city level. The regressions doing this are presented in Tables 3a, 3b and 
3c, using both the LA and TTWA as the ‘city’ unit. All these regressions are run using 
weighted least squares, the weights being the number of the relevant ethnic minority 
group in that area. Each table reports six specifications. The first two regress the test 
score gap on school segregation and the city proportion of that group. Specification 2 
adds to specification 1 by adding the city average minority-White difference in the 
income deprivation index. Specifications 3 and 4 are analogous to specifications 1 and 
2 but use neighbourhood as opposed to school segregation. In specifications 5 and 6 
we use the part of school segregation that is orthogonal to neighbourhood segregation 
(the residuals from a regression of school segregation on neighbourhood segregation) 
as our school segregation measure when we include both school and neighbourhood 
segregation; specification 6 also includes the city average minority-White difference 
in neighbourhood income deprivation. 
 
Focussing first on Table 3a, the regressions for Black Caribbean pupils, there is a 
consistently  negative  and  significant  relationship  between  the  test  score  gap  and 
school segregation using LAs as the definition of the ‘city’. In fact, this is the one 
consistently  significant  coefficient  across  the  specifications:  neighbourhood 
segregation  is  only  negative  and  significant  when  we  do  not  include  school   13 
segregation or average neighbourhood income deprivation differences, and income 
deprivation  is  only  significant  in  two.  Looking  at  the  results  with  the  TTWA 
definition of a city, we see that segregation has no significant effect in any of the 
specifications. However, we are now down to just 13 observations, so this may simply 
be because of so little information.  
 
Table 3b reports the results for Indian pupils. For Indian pupils there appears to be no 
robust relationship between the test score gap and either school or neighbourhood 
segregation, either with LA or TTWA. The income deprivation term is consistently 
negative  and  significant.  Over  and  above  neighbourhood  differences  in  income 
deprivation there is little or no relationship between the test score gap and segregation 
at school or home for Indian pupils.  
 
We report results for Pakistani ethnicity pupils in Table 3c. Again there appears to be 
no relationship between the test score gap and school segregation after controlling for 
neighbourhood segregation and neighbourhood income differences.  
 
c)  Ethnic Minority Attainment 
 
This set of results addresses the question about the absolute attainment of minority 
ethnic students and segregation. The equation we estimate is given by (7), repeated 
here: 
 
{ } u Q N g s i c c is + Ñ + Ñ + S Ñ + = Ñ . . . j d p g  
 
The main threat to the identification of the true impact of levels of school segregation 
within a city on the test scores of a particular ethnic group is that the mix of families 
differs  across  cities  in  ways  that  matter  for  educational  attainment,  and  that  are 
correlated  with  city-level  segregation.  This  includes  factors  such  as  parental 
resources,  child  ability,  parental  human  capital  and  so  on.  The  idea  is  that  by 
controlling for these background factors we isolate the effect of living in a city in 
which schools are more segregated. We maintain the assumption of conditional mean 
independence; that conditional on the city-level variables we include, the distribution 
of  other  family  influences  on  outcomes  are  uncorrelated  with  the  degree  of 
segregation.  
 
Note  that  we  are  not  attempting  to  model  attendance  at  particular  schools  –  the 
‘treatment’ is living in a particular type of city, not a particular school. The selection 
problems for the city-level decision seem less than that for a school-level decision, 
and indeed a cross-city research design has been often used (Hoxby 2000). 
 
It seems very likely that there are heterogeneous effects of segregation. The most 
obvious source of this is poverty. In a highly segregated city, poor pupils are more 
likely to be in a particularly low income school and/or neighbourhood than non-poor 
pupils. Whilst regression and matching approaches both require the same conditional 
independence  assumption,  a  matching  approach  works  much  better  if  there  are 
heterogeneous  treatment  effects  (see  Cobb-Clark  and  Crossley,  2003).  We  use 
matching procedures to focus on observationally equivalent pupils. The ‘treatment’ is   14 
living in a high segregation city and the ‘control’ is living in a low segregation city
24. 
An LA is assumed to be treated if its school segregation measure is equal to or larger 
than the 90
th percentile of the ethnicity-specific LA school-segregation distribution. 
 
We chose to perform the match on pupil characteristics and to deal with differences 
between cities (LAs) with post-matching regression. It proved infeasible to match on 
LA variables as there was little overlap between the propensity score distributions. In 
essence  this  is  because  the  LAs  are  few  and  are  rather  different.  Our  main 
specification  is  pupils  matched  on  pupil  characteristics,  controlling  for  LA 
characteristics  by  regression.  Figure  3  confirms  that  there  is  sufficient  common 
support for each of these groups – we find sufficient ‘treated’ (high segregation) and 
untreated pupils at all levels of the propensity score.  
 
We then matched each treated observation to their untreated counterpart using radius 
matching with a caliper of zero. The variables used to match were: gender, FSM-
eligibility, age within year, cohort year. With these samples we then regressed the 
difference in the test-score on the differences in LA-level covariates, the constant in 
these regressions giving us our treatment effect. 
 
We again make the distinction between the total effect of segregation and the effect 
coming through assignment to particular qualities of school and neighbourhood. Our 
main specifications refer to the first. But we also present results controlling for the 
quality of school and neighbourhood whilst emphasising that they are very likely to 
be endogenous.  
 
We first present results from the naïve straightforward OLS regressions on all the data 
– see Tables 4a, b, c. These are for comparison to the matched results below. The 
point is that with heterogeneous effects of segregation, the matched estimates offer a 
more meaningful estimate, the average effect of treatment on the treated (ATT).  
 
For  each  group  we  offer  four  specifications:  the  first  simply  includes  the  high 
segregation  dummy;  the  second  adds  pupil  characteristics  and  is  therefore  the 
equivalent  of  the  unconditional  treatment  effect  below;  the  third  adds  city  level 
variables and is our preferred specification; and the fourth adds local neighbourhood 
controls. The key coefficient is on school segregation. The city level controls relate to 
deprivation (average income deprivation, the unemployment rate and the proportion 
of lone parents), city-wide educational quality (the Ofsted LA report) and the ethnic 
group proportion. Local controls are income and employment deprivation, average 
household income and school quality
25.  
 
Table 4a reports outcomes for Black Caribbean pupils. In column 1 with no controls 
we  find  a  positive  effect  and  this  remains  in  column  2  adding  just  pupil 
characteristics.  Once  we  control  for  city  characteristics  the  coefficient  increases 
substantially but the standard error also increases. The big fall in precision is largely 
because of the problem noted above: the Black Caribbean population is concentrated 
                                                 
24 The highly segregated cities are for Black Caribbean pupils London and Birmingham only; for 
Indian ethnicity pupils Birmingham, Blackburn with Darwen, Leicester, London, Wolverhampton; and 
for Pakistani ethnicity pupils Birmingham, Bradford, Calderdale, Luton, Slough.  
25 We use the value added of White pupils at the school as our measure of school quality, in attempt to 
avoid the issue of selection into schools and replicating the dependent variable respectively.   15 
in very few LAs once London is aggregated into one. In column 4 the introduction of 
local controls has a substantial effect on the coefficient and it becomes insignificant. 
We see the same pattern for pupils of Indian ethnicity in Table 4b. Including only 
pupil characteristics we find a small positive relationship. Once we control for city 
differences the estimated coefficient increases and remains significant. Finally, with 
local controls, the effect of segregation is eliminated. For Pakistani pupils the pattern 
is different. In columns 1 and 2, the naïve regressions  yield a negative effect but 
adding in city variables turns it small and positive. For this group, the effect is not all 
eliminated by the addition of local controls in specification (4).  
 
However, the results using the matched sample represent our main findings, in Table 
5a, b, c. The dependent variable is the difference between the GCSE points of the 
focus  pupil  (cell)  in  a  high  segregation  city  and  the  average  of  the  pupils  in  the 
equivalent cell in low segregation cities. The  coefficient in column (2) is the full 
effect of segregation, including both the direct effect and the indirect effect arising 
from differences in the characteristics of the local neighbourhood and school, as in 
Card and Rothstein (2007).  
 
When performing matching we introduce additional source of variability, beyond the 
normal sampling variation, through estimating a propensity score and performing the 
matching  process.  This  implies  that  we  cannot  use  standard  errors  from  our 
regressions to determine the statistical significance of the treatment effects (Heckman, 
Ichimura and Todd 1998). Much of the matching literature uses bootstrap techniques 
to  find  valid  standard  errors  (Smith  2000).  This  entails  drawing  samples  with 
replacement from the population of pupils. The number of draws equals the number of 
pupils in the original population. The matching process and post matching regressions 
are then performed for the sample. This process is repeated a sufficient number of 
times (500 times in our analysis), yielding 500 estimates of ATT (average treatment 
on the treated). The bootstrap standard error we provide is the standard error in this 
generated sample of ATT estimates. 
 
The results for Black Caribbean pupils are in Table 5a. Column 1 is the unconditional 
ATT, and implies a significant positive effect of segregation. Adding city controls in 
column 2 increases the size of this substantially, but using the boot-strapped standard 
error it loses significance. As in the naïve regression, adding in the local controls in 
column 3 reduces the size and significance further. We discuss specifications 4 and 5 
in the next sub-section. The unconditional effect of segregation for Indian pupils is 
also significantly positive, but  adding city  controls pushes the effect to zero. The 
inclusion  of  local  neighbourhood  characteristics  has  an  interesting  effect,  and  the 
estimated  effect  is  now  negative  and  significant.  Turning  to  Pakistani  pupils,  the 
negative unconditional treatment effect becomes insignificant once we include city 
controls, and remains so when we add the local controls.  
 
To summarise: our main specification is column (2) of Table 5. We find a positive but 
insignificant effect of school segregation on test score outcomes for Black Caribbean 




   16 
d)  Robustness checks on matching 
 
We now focus on the role of prior attainment in the results. This potentially fulfils two 
roles, and the interpretation of the results is different for each. First, by controlling for 
prior attainment, we are focussing all attention on pupils’ educational progress from 
age 11 to age 16; by not controlling for it, we are picking up the entire impact of 
segregation,  rather  than  partialling  it  out  into  before  and  after  age  11.  This 
interpretation of any change in the estimated segregation effect is therefore about the 
timing of the impact of segregation. Second, analysing absolute attainment in this 
approach,  it  is  harder  to  deal  with  heterogeneity  between  the  different  cities, 
particularly  in  terms  of  household  characteristics  that  are  positively  related  to 
educational attainment. The inclusion of the prior attainment with the other personal 
characteristics goes some way to absorbing some of that heterogeneity. Given these 
two interpretations, the implications of the results are as follows: a positive result 
whilst  including  prior  attainment  means  that  there  is  an  effect  during  secondary 
school, even controlling for parental support; a negative result might mean that all the 
effect comes before secondary school, or that the estimated effect is simply due to 
correlation with household characteristics. 
 
We deal with this issue in two ways, which reveal essentially the same story. First, we 
simply control for KS2 scores in the post-matching regressions. This is reported in 
columns 4 and 5 in Table 5. For Black Caribbean pupils, inclusion of KS2 scores 
reduces the size of the segregation coefficient in columns 3 and 5 and they remain 
insignificant. For Indian students, the inclusion of KS2 scores raises the size of the 
coefficient in column 4 but it remains insignificant. For Pakistani pupils it has no 
effect. Second, we explicitly focus on progress during secondary schooling and model 
value-added (progress from KS2 to GCSE). The results unsurprisingly mirror those 
above (results available from the authors).  
 
We finally perform the matching on personal characteristics plus the Mosaic code for 
each  pupil  (results  not  reported  here).  This  is  exact  matching,  though  for  Black 
Caribbean students the match is very poor with only a sample of around 6000 rather 
than 15000. For Pakistani and Indian students, the main results hold up with slightly 
reduced  but  significant  coefficients.  Perhaps  unsurprisingly,  for  Black  Caribbean 





The segregation of minority ethnic students in schools and neighbourhoods remains 
an issue of great public policy interest. In this paper we explore one of the potential 
effects  of  this  –  on  the  educational  attainment  of  minority  ethnic  students.  We 
investigate  whether  segregation  influences  the  test  score  gap  between  White  and 
minority students, and whether it has an effect on the absolute attainment of minority 
students. Our analysis throughout allows for different effects on the different groups 
we analyse: Black Caribbean, Indian and Pakistani. The dataset that we start with is a 
census of all students in state schools in England, and we combine three cohorts from 
that census containing in total some 1.5m students. Nevertheless, schools in England 
are overwhelmingly White, and the minority ethnic students are concentrated in a 
relatively small number of cities. This concentration means that the effective amount   17 
of information in the data is quite limited, and this needs to be borne in mind as a 
caveat to our findings.  
 
We show that the test score gap between White and minority ethnic students is largely 
unaffected by segregation for all three groups. Once we control for differences in 
prosperity and use a geography that best fits our identification strategy, we find that 
segregation has no impact on the test score gap. This is in stark contrast to findings 
for  the  US,  where  the  equivalent  study  (Card  and  Rothstein,  2007)  shows  that 
segregation raises the gap. Comparing the performance of a particular minority group 
across cities with varying levels of segregation, we find different results for different 
groups,  but  overall  there  is  no  tendency  for  significant  negative  effects  of  school 
segregation.  
 
We can speculate on the reasons for the difference between the results in England and 
in the US, but this would surely merit more formal analysis as well. There are of 
course a number of important differences between the education systems in the two 
countries.  One  candidate  is  the  much  greater  importance  of  centralised  education 
funding in the UK, which actively attempts to equalise educational spending per head. 
A second relevant point is that the nature of the academic performance of the relevant 
minority groups is very different. In the US, the Black-White score gap is very stark, 
whereas the overall differences in England are smaller, with some minority ethnic 
groups out-scoring Whites. This means that, for example, Indian pupils in schools 
with many other Indian pupils may experience a positive peer effect relative to Indian 
students learning  with  mostly White peers. As Cutler, Glaeser and Vigdor (2005) 
note, the outcome of segregation depends on who you are segregated with. Thirdly, 
levels of school and neighbourhood segregation are lower in England than in the US. 
It could be that the deleterious effects of segregation found for the US only occur at 
very  high  levels.  Our  results  show,  therefore,  that  the  ‘effects  of  segregation’  are 
contingent  on  context,  and  the  rather  different  context  studied  here  provides  an 
additional piece of evidence to the US case.  
 
The results need to be interpreted cautiously for reasons explained in detail above. 
Nevertheless, taken at face value, they have interesting implications. We find that 
segregation does not have a negative impact on school outcomes, but nor does it 
positively impact on the attainment of different ethnic groups. Looking at the broader 
picture, low levels of segregation are often considered a contributory factor in raising 
social and cultural cohesion. Indeed, the Ouseley Report (2001) on disturbances in 
several northern English cities in 2001 argued that these occurred in part because of ‘a 
segregated  school  system  that  has  failed  to  challenge  negative  attitudes  and 
stereotypes and that has played a marginal role in brokering cultural shifts between 
family, school, and public life’ (Amin 2002 page 962; see also Amin 2003). More 
recently,  a  UK  Government  Select  Committee  inquiry  into  social  cohesion 
emphasised that the fact schools do not reflect the range of groups in the locality 
hindered  the  promotion  of  social  cohesion  (House  of  Commons  2004;  para.  49). 
Recent  research  using  a  robust  randomised  design  confirms  that  social  interaction 
with  students  from  minority  ethnic  groups  engenders  a  more  sympathetic  attitude 
from  Whites  to  that  group  (Boisjoly  et  al  2006).  Low  levels  of  segregation  are 
consistent with higher levels of interaction and so potentially greater social cohesion. 
The fact that our results suggest that levels of segregation do not impact – either 
positively or negatively – on test score outcomes adds weight to the call for increasing   18 
integration of different ethnic groups at school in order to increase the potential for 
improved social cohesion.  
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Table 1: Sample by Ethnicity 
 
 







FSM pupils  
 Mean IMD 
White  1,427,027  88.06  40.94  12  21.60 
Black Caribbean  23,233  1.43  33.09  28  35.44 
Black African  20,674  1.28  38.02  39  35.62 
Black Other  13,700  0.85  34.78  31  33.75 
Indian  41,527  2.56  48.37  13  25.91 
Pakistani  40,086  2.47  37.65  41  38.91 
Bangladeshi  15,122  0.93  39.88  63  42.90 
Chinese  5,881  0.36  54.80  13  23.23 
Other  33,193  2.05  41.35  28  28.63 
Total  1,620,443         
The sample combines three cohorts, taking GCSEs in 2002, 2003 and 2004.  
FSM is eligibility for Free School Meals, referring to the GCSE year 
IMD is a measure of neighbourhood deprivation, referring to the GCSE year   24 
Table 2: Number of LAs included in analysis sample and minimum number of pupils in one of those LAs 
 
Group  2% Cut-off  1% Cut-off 








Black Caribbean  9  84  22  64 
Black African  6  66  11  66 
Black Other  9  144  17  37 
Indian  28  114  43  48 
Pakistani  35  114  48  87 
Bangladeshi  5  181  16  95 
Chinese  0  0  1  79 
Other  24  97  45  43 
* Sample is merged 2002, 2003 and 2004 PLASCs using old ethnicity codes and including London LAs as 1 region. 
 
Note: Number of observations means number of LAs 
          Minimum number is the lowest number of pupils in an LA   25 
Table 3a: OLS regressions of Black Caribbean-White GSCE point score gap on school and neighbourhood segregation 
 
By LA: 
  1  2  3  4  5  6 
-63.924  -56.885          Black Caribbean-White diff in school fraction Black Caribbean 
(3.84)**  (3.27)**         
        -65.688  -109.036  Residual Black Caribbean-White diff in school fraction Black Caribbean          (2.61)*  (4.16)** 
    -47.497  -38.596  -41.935  27.762  Black Caribbean-White diff in neighbourhood fraction Black Caribbean      (2.32)*  (1.14)  (2.34)*  (0.96) 
  -13.570    -6.919    -51.326  Black Caribbean-White diff in neighbourhood Income deprivation    (1.23)    (0.34)    (2.82)* 
LA proportion Black Caribbean  54.694  42.270  10.957  1.927  54.921  16.943 
  (2.03)  (1.49)  (0.43)  (0.05)  (1.97)  (0.63) 
Constant  -4.958  -3.511  -3.882  -3.387  -5.364  -2.673 
  (4.88)**  (2.28)*  (2.90)**  (1.68)  (4.14)**  (1.84) 
Observations  21  21  21  21  21  21 
R-squared  0.50  0.54  0.30  0.30  0.50  0.66 
Note:   Units are Local Education Authorities 
  Dependent variable is the Adjusted point score.  
  Residual school segregation is the residuals from a regression of school segregation on neighbourhood segregation. 
 
By TTWA: 
  1  2  3  4  5  6 
Black Caribbean-White diff in school fraction Black Caribbean  3.362  -7.961         
  (0.13)  (0.24)         
        -3.536  41.205  Residual Black Caribbean-White diff in school fraction Black Caribbean          (0.08)  (0.75) 
Black Caribbean-White diff in neighbourhood fraction Black Caribbean      5.114  -65.731  4.890  -110.882 
      (0.24)  (0.89)  (0.22)  (1.15) 
Black Caribbean-White diff in neighbourhood Income deprivation    8.426    41.267    69.090 
    (0.54)    (1.01)    (1.23) 
TTWA proportion Black Caribbean  -33.110  -9.240  -32.528  61.934  -28.967  84.128 
  (0.71)  (0.14)  (1.10)  (0.63)  (0.55)  (0.80) 
Constant  -5.785  -6.832  -5.957  -8.860  -6.021  -10.074 
  (4.79)**  (2.95)*  (4.04)**  (2.74)*  (3.48)**  (2.73)* 
Observations  13  13  13  13  13  13 
R-squared  0.14  0.17  0.14  0.23  0.14  0.28 
Note:   Units are TTWA 
  Dependent variable is the Adjusted point score.  
  Residual school segregation is the residuals from a regression of school segregation on neighbourhood segregation.   26 
 
Table 3b: OLS regressions of Indian-White GSCE point score gap on school and neighbourhood segregation 
 
By LA: 
  1  2  3  4  5  6 
Indian-White diff in school fraction Indian  -12.410  -9.189         
  (2.40)*  (1.99)         
Residual Indian-White diff in school fraction Indian          -8.926  -14.127 
          (0.82)  (1.47) 
Indian-White diff in neighbourhood fraction Indian      -13.644  -7.962  -12.763  -6.175 
      (2.26)*  (1.41)  (2.08)*  (1.08) 
Indian-White diff in neighbourhood Income deprivation    -35.798    -35.149    -37.576 
    (3.53)**    (3.28)**    (3.52)** 
LA proportion Indian  25.932  15.486  26.272  13.822  26.767  13.745 
  (3.84)**  (2.34)*  (3.68)**  (1.86)  (3.72)**  (1.88) 
Constant  8.293  9.207  8.469  9.105  8.513  9.217 
  (11.67)**  (13.65)**  (10.72)**  (12.46)**  (10.71)**  (12.74)** 
Observations  41  41  41  41  41  41 
R-squared  0.29  0.47  0.28  0.44  0.29  0.48 
Note:   Units are Local Education Authorities 
  Dependent variable is the Adjusted point score.  
  Residual school segregation is the residuals from a regression of school segregation on neighbourhood segregation. 
 
By TTWA: 
  1  2  3  4  5  6 
Indian-White diff in school fraction Indian  -7.091  0.721         
  (1.05)  (0.11)         
Residual Indian-White diff in school fraction Indian          7.898  5.276 
          (0.71)  (0.49) 
Indian-White diff in neighbourhood fraction Indian      -13.123  -2.370  -12.125  -2.005 
      (1.87)  (0.28)  (1.68)  (0.24) 
Indian-White diff in neighbourhood Income deprivation    -28.145    -25.629    -24.911 
    (2.66)*    (2.15)*    (2.05)* 
TTWA proportion Indian  14.734  0.575  23.918  6.048  20.615  4.341 
  (1.04)  (0.04)  (1.79)  (0.40)  (1.45)  (0.28) 
Constant  7.230  7.987  7.730  8.076  7.601  7.980 
  (11.51)**  (12.40)**  (11.25)**  (12.01)**  (10.61)**  (11.28)** 
Observations  36  36  36  36  36  36 
R-squared  0.03  0.21  0.10  0.21  0.11  0.22 
Note:   Units are TTWE 
  Dependent variable is the Adjusted point score.  
  Residual school segregation is the residuals from a regression of school segregation on neighbourhood segregation.   27 
 
Table 3c: OLS regressions of Pakistani-White GSCE point score gap on school and neighbourhood segregation 
 
By LA: 
  1  2  3  4  5  6 
Pakistani-White diff in school fraction Pakistani  -23.772  -4.638         
  (2.74)**  (0.47)         
Residual Pakistani-White diff in school fraction Pakistani          -13.442  -7.125 
          (1.17)  (0.66) 
Pakistani-White diff in neighbourhood fraction Pakistani      -15.463  2.546  -20.623  -0.955 
      (2.84)**  (0.34)  (2.95)**  (0.10) 
Pakistani-White diff in neighbourhood Income deprivation    -36.360    -42.943    -41.115 
    (3.28)**    (3.17)**    (2.96)** 
LA proportion Pakistani  42.762  23.259  22.309  13.438  38.865  22.591 
  (2.41)*  (1.36)  (2.04)*  (1.30)  (2.18)*  (1.30) 
Constant  0.048  1.099  0.521  0.910  0.957  1.125 
  (0.05)  (1.18)  (0.50)  (0.95)  (0.86)  (1.10) 
Observations  47  47  47  47  47  47 
R-squared  0.15  0.32  0.16  0.32  0.18  0.32 
Note:   Units are Local Education Authorities 
  Dependent variable is the Adjusted point score.  
  Residual school segregation is the residuals from a regression of school segregation on neighbourhood segregation. 
 
By TTWA: 
  1  2  3  4  5  6 
Pakistani-White diff in school fraction Pakistani  -3.408  3.284         
  (0.66)  (0.47)         
Residual Pakistani-White diff in school fraction Pakistani          1.536  3.189 
          (0.20)  (0.41) 
Pakistani-White diff in neighbourhood fraction Pakistani      -6.571  2.328  -6.621  2.953 
      (1.10)  (0.22)  (1.09)  (0.27) 
Pakistani-White diff in neighbourhood Income deprivation    -20.021    -18.848    -20.392 
    (1.42)    (1.03)    (1.07) 
TTWA proportion Pakistani  8.279  5.030  13.808  6.215  13.398  4.742 
  (0.68)  (0.41)  (1.05)  (0.41)  (0.99)  (0.30) 
Constant  -1.462  -0.377  -0.870  -0.441  -0.899  -0.464 
  (1.43)  (0.30)  (0.72)  (0.34)  (0.73)  (0.36) 
Observations  37  37  37  37  37  37 
R-squared  0.01  0.07  0.04  0.07  0.04  0.07 
Note:   Units are TTWA 
  Dependent variable is the Adjusted point score.  
  Residual school segregation is the residuals from a regression of school segregation on neighbourhood segregation.    28 
Table 4a. OLS regressions on total GCSE points for Black Caribbean Pupils 
  1  2  3  4 









Pupil controls?  N  Y  Y  Y 
City Controls?  N  N  Y  Y 
Local controls: 
 
       
 
Income Deprivation Index        -18.29 
(-7.18)** 
Employment Deprivation Index        1.32 
(0.30) 
Median neighbourhood household 
income 
      0.01 
(0.51) 
School Quality        1.08 
(36.25)** 
 








         
Observations  19993  19993  19993  19847 
R-squared  0.00  0.07  0.07  0.15 
 t-statistics in parenthesis. **significant at 1%, *significant at 5% 
 
Notes:    1. Controls for pupil characteristics: FSM, language, gender, month of birth, year of study 
2. Controls for LA level characteristics: proportion of lone parents, LA Black Caribbean Unemployment rate (gender specific), LA quality (Ofsted Inspection), LA 
mean Income Deprivation Index, LA proportion of Black Caribbeans, LA Black Caribbean proportion with ‘lower level’ and ‘higher level’ qualifications, LA Black 
Caribbean proportion of working in managerial and professional occupations, LA Black Caribbean proportion of born outside UK  
  3. School quality is the value-added computed for white pupils in that school   29 
Table 4b. OLS regressions on total GCSE points for Indian Pupils 
  1  2  3  4 









Pupil controls?  N  Y  Y  Y 
City Controls?  N  N  Y  Y 
Local controls: 
 
       
 
Income Deprivation Index        -15.87 
(-7.52)** 
Employment Deprivation Index        8.20 
(2.04)* 
Median neighbourhood household 
income 
      0.21 
(11.30)** 
School Quality   
 
    0.95 
(0.02)** 
 








         
Observations  38188  38188  38188  38023 
R-squared  0.00  0.06  0.07  0.14 
 t-statistic in parenthesis. **significant at 1%, *significant at 5% 
 
Notes:    1. Controls for pupil characteristics: FSM, language, gender, month of birth, year of study 
2. Controls for LA level characteristics: proportion of lone parents, LA Indian Unemployment rate (gender specific), LA quality (Ofsted Inspection), LA mean 
Income Deprivation Index, LA proportion of Indians, LA Indian proportion with ‘lower level’ and ‘higher level’ qualifications, LA Indian proportion of working in 
managerial and professional occupations, LA Indian proportion of born outside UK  
  3. School quality is the value-added computed for white pupils in that school   30 
Table 4c. OLS regressions on total GCSE points for Pakistani Pupils 
  1  2  3  4 









Pupil controls?  N  Y  Y  Y 
City controls?  N  N  Y  Y 
Local controls: 
 
       
Income Deprivation Index        -10.03 
(-5.21)** 
Employment Deprivation Index        7.44 
(2.31)* 
Median neighbourhood household 
income 
      0.28 
(11.19)** 
School Quality        0.48 
(24.06)** 
 








         
Observations  37871  37871  37871  37404 
R-squared  0.00  0.06  0.08  0.11 
 t-statistics in parenthesis. **significant at 1%, *significant at 5% 
 
Notes:    1. Controls for pupil characteristics: FSM, language, gender, month of birth, year of study 
2. Controls for LA level characteristics: proportion of lone parents, LA Pakistani Unemployment rate (gender specific), LA quality (Ofsted Inspection), LA mean 
Income Deprivation Index, LA proportion of Pakistani, LA Pakistani proportion with ‘lower level’ and ‘higher level’ qualifications, LA Pakistani proportion of working in 
managerial and professional occupations, LA Pakistani proportion of born outside UK  
  3. School quality is the value-added computed for white pupils in that school 
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Table 5a. OLS results for post matching regressions for Black Caribbeans. Matching on pupil level characteristics. 
  Unconditional 
ATT 
LA-level  Neighbourhood 
level 
LA-level & KS2 
scores 
Neighbourhood 
level & KS2 scores 































Local Controls:           
           
Income Deprivation Index      -23.25 
(7.90)** 
  -18.51 
(7.44)** 
Employment Deprivation Index      6.36 
(1.22) 
  7.17 
(1.63) 
Median neighbourhood household 
income 
    -0.03 
(0.99) 
  -0.08 
(3.40)** 
School Quality      1.06 
(32.15)** 
  0.87 
(31.12)** 













1  15652  15652  15511  13438  13329 
R-squared  0.00  0.00  0.08  0.37  0.43 
t statistics in parenthesis    *Significant at 5%     **Significant at 1%  
 
Notes:   1. Controls for LA level characteristics: proportion of lone parents, LA Black Caribbean Unemployment rate (gender specific), LA quality (Ofsted Inspection), LA 
mean Income Deprivation Index, LA proportion of Black Caribbeans, LA Black Caribbean proportion with ‘lower level’ and ‘higher level’ qualifications, LA Black 
Caribbean proportion of working in managerial and professional occupations, LA Black Caribbean proportion of born outside UK  
  2. Neighbourhood level and Neighbourhood level & KS2 scores post matching regressions do not control for LA mean Income Deprivation Index 
 
1Number of treated with at least one match from untreated sample 
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Table 5b. OLS results for post matching regressions for Indians. Matching on pupil level characteristics. 
  Unconditional 
ATT 
LA-level  Neighbourhood 
level 
LA-level & KS2 
scores 
Neighbourhood 
level & KS2 scores 
































Local Controls:           
Income Deprivation Index      -11.61 
(4.16)** 
  -2.40 
(1.12) 
Employment Deprivation Index      -8.92 
(1.65) 
  -14.63 
(3.53)** 
Median neighbourhood household 
income 
    0.19 
(7.72)** 
  0.04 
(2.27)* 
School Quality      0.83 
(31.65)** 
  0.56 
(27.38)** 
KS2 English score        1.15 
(40.72)** 
 
KS2 Maths score        1.23 
(45.45)** 
 




1  24556  24556  24398  22342  22240 
R-squared  0.00  0.02  0.08  0.46  0.48 
t statistics in parenthesis    *Significant at 5%     **Significant at 1%  
 
Notes:   1. Controls for LA level characteristics: proportion of lone parents, LA Indian Unemployment rate (gender specific), LA quality (Ofsted Inspection), LA mean 
Income Deprivation Index, LA proportion of Indians, LA Indian proportion with ‘lower level’ and ‘higher level’ qualifications, LA Indian proportion of working in 
managerial and professional occupations, LA Indian proportion of born outside UK  
  2. Neighbourhood level and Neighbourhood level & KS2 scores post matching regressions do not control for LA mean Income Deprivation Index 
 
1Number of treated with at least one match from untreated sample   33 
Table 5c. OLS results for post matching regressions for Pakistanis. Matching on pupil level characteristics. 
  Unconditional 
ATT 
LA-level  Neighbourhood 
level 
LA-level & KS2 
scores 
Neighbourhood 
level & KS2 scores 
































Local Controls:           
Income Deprivation Index      -2.09 
(0.56) 
  1.14 
(0.39) 
Employment Deprivation Index      -8.80 
(1.48) 
  -14.68 
(3.14)** 
Median neighbourhood household 
income 
    0.42 
(5.99)** 
  0.09 
(1.58) 
School Quality      0.37 
(13.41)** 
  0.27 
(12.31)** 













1  12550  12550  12147  10993  10634 
R-squared  0.00  0.02  0.05  0.46  0.47 
t statistics in parenthesis    *Significant at 5%     **Significant at 1%  
 
Notes:   1. Controls for LA level characteristics: proportion of lone parents, LA Pakistani Unemployment rate (gender specific), LA quality (Ofsted Inspection), LA mean 
Income Deprivation Index, LA proportion of Pakistani, LA Pakistani proportion with ‘lower level’ and ‘higher level’ qualifications, LA Pakistani proportion of working in 
managerial and professional occupations, LA Pakistani proportion of born outside UK  
  2. Neighbourhood level and Neighbourhood level & KS2 scores post matching regressions do not control for LA mean Income Deprivation Index 
 
1Number of treated with at least one match from untreated sample   34 
 Figure 1: Definition of Aggregate Areas 
  Local Education Administration            Travel-to-Work Areas 
 
This work is based on data provided through EDINA UKBORDERS with the support of the ESRC and JISC and uses boundary material which 
is copyright of the Crown, the Post Office and the ED-LINE Consortium. 
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Units are the LAs, weighted by the number of respective minority pupils. 
Line is a regression of the point score gap on segregation, weighted by LA minority 
pupils.   36 














Note: Treatment – LA school segregation is higher than 90
th percentile   37 
Appendix Table 1: Adjusted GCSE point score FE regression 
 
  Total GCSE point score 
Pupil FSM eligibility  -10.872 
  (165.27)** 
Male dummy  -4.866 
  (110.12)** 
Born in July dummy  0.420 
  (4.29)** 
Born in June dummy  0.696 
  (7.06)** 
Born in May dummy  0.994 
  (10.14)** 
Born in April dummy  1.034 
  (10.43)** 
Born in March dummy  1.341 
  (13.63)** 
Born in February dummy  1.401 
  (13.80)** 
Born in January dummy  1.514 
  (15.13)** 
Born in December dummy  1.718 
  (17.03)** 
Born in November dummy  2.019 
  (19.88)** 
Born in October dummy  2.465 
  (24.76)** 
Born in September dummy  2.490 
  (25.10)** 
FSM*Black Caribbean dummy  7.224 
  (25.33)** 
FSM*Indian dummy  4.703 
  (16.59)** 
FSM*Pakistani dummy  6.851 
  (34.20)** 
Male*Black Caribbean dummy  -2.119 
  (7.41)** 
Male *Indian dummy  -0.097 
  (0.47) 
Male *Pakistani dummy  -1.181 
  (5.55)** 
Born in July *Black Caribbean dummy  0.091 
  (0.15) 
Born in July *Indian dummy  -0.194 
  (0.44) 
Born in July *Pakistani dummy  0.201 
  (0.46) 
Born in June *Black Caribbean dummy  0.243 
  (0.41) 
Born in June *Indian dummy  -0.347 
  (0.77) 
Born in June *Pakistani dummy  0.673 
  (1.51) 
Born in May *Black Caribbean dummy  -0.196 
  (0.33) 
Born in May *Indian dummy  -0.097 
  (0.22) 
Born in May *Pakistani dummy  0.724 
  (1.63) 
Born in April *Black Caribbean dummy  -0.620   38 
  (1.04) 
Born in April *Indian dummy  -0.550 
  (1.21) 
Born in April *Pakistani dummy  -0.227 
  (0.51) 
Born in March *Black Caribbean dummy  -0.183 
  (0.31) 
Born in March *Indian dummy  -0.633 
  (1.42) 
Born in March *Pakistani dummy  0.526 
  (1.20) 
Born in February *Black Caribbean 
dummy  -0.104 
  (0.17) 
Born in February *Indian dummy  -0.722 
  (1.57) 
Born in February *Pakistani dummy  0.582 
  (1.26) 
Born in January *Black Caribbean dummy  -0.247 
  (0.42) 
Born in January *Indian dummy  -0.297 
  (0.67) 
Born in January *Pakistani dummy  0.226 
  (0.51) 
Born in December *Black Caribbean 
dummy 
-0.118 
  (0.20) 
Born in December *Indian dummy  0.016 
  (0.03) 
Born in December *Pakistani dummy  0.564 
  (1.27) 
Born in November *Black Caribbean 
dummy 
-0.824 
  (1.37) 
Born in November *Indian dummy  -0.410 
  (0.91) 
Born in November *Pakistani dummy  1.412 
  (3.16)** 
Born in October *Black Caribbean dummy  -0.413 
  (0.71) 
Born in October *Indian dummy  -0.053 
  (0.12) 
Born in October *Pakistani dummy  0.703 
  (1.59) 
Born in September *Black Caribbean 
dummy 
-0.088 
  (0.15) 
Born in September *Indian dummy  -0.361 
  (0.81) 
Born in September *Pakistani dummy  0.564 
  (1.27) 
Constant  42.951 
  (652.62)** 
Observations  919669 
R-squared  0.32 
 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses   
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%   
 
Note: Also allows for ethnicity specific school effects  